M
any analysts rank cultured and genetically engineered biological organisms as the most dangerous of all existing weapons technologies, with the potential for producing more extensive and devastating effects on human populations than even fusion nuclear weapons (Henderson 1999) . Biological weapons (bioweapons) are defined as biological organisms, and substances derived directly from living organisms, that can be used to cause death or injury to humans, animals, or plants. Diseases and biological toxins have been used as weapons of war throughout recorded history, from at least as early as Biblical times to the present day. Historically, bioweapons were used primarily, although not exclusively, for direct attacks against human populations. Biowarfare has historically involved the use of plant and fungal toxins (hellebore, ergot), animal carcasses, human cadavers, disease-contaminated clothing or blankets, and fecal matter (Christopher et al. 1997 , Kortepeter et al. 2001 . The potential spectrum of bioterrorism ranges from isolated acts against individuals by individuals (rogue scientist or Unabomber-type scenarios) to tactical and strategic military uses and state-sponsored international terrorism intended to cause mass casualties within or among humans or animals or both (Tucker 2000 , Zilinskas 2000 .
Perhaps the oldest traditional application of bioweapon techniques has been the contamination or poisoning of drinking water sources using animal carcasses, human cadavers, feces, or poisonous plants and their derivatives. During the 14th century, Mongol armies catapulted the infected corpses of plague victims over the walls into the besieged city of Caffa, in what is now the Crimea, to try to force the surrender of the city's inhabitants. During the 18th century, the British colonial army used smallpox-contaminated blankets to spread disease among Native American tribes in northeastern North America and smallpox-infected civilian infiltrators to spread disease among insurgent American militias during the American Revolutionary War (Wheelis 1999) .
Government-sponsored scientific research into the development of technologically sophisticated applications of biological weapons for use against humans, livestock, and crops began during the early decades of the 20th century. Most government bioweapons programs included research on the culture and testing of disease agents intended specifically for use against livestock and food crops (Ban 2000) . During World War I, Germany investigated techniques for using anthrax, glanders, cholera, and fungal diseases of wheat as biological weapons. German espionage agents attempted to create outbreaks of anthrax among livestock in Romania and Argentina and spread glanders among horses and mulesthen still critically important as cavalry mounts and draft animals for the transport of artillery, ordnance, and suppliesin Mesopotamia, France, Argentina, and the United States. Germany was also implicated in an attempt to precipitate an epidemic of plague among humans in St. Petersburg, Russia (Dire and McGovern 2002) . Japan developed and used biological weapons against human and animal populations in Asia during the period 1932 -1945 (Kortepeter et al. 2001 . Plagueinfected fleas were reportedly used by the Japanese to precipitate plague epidemics in China during World War II, and it has been estimated that some 10,000 human subjects were used for bioweapon experiments in China involving anthrax, plague, tularemia, and smallpox (Christopher et al. 1997) .
During the 1980s and 1990s, Soviet scientists used newly developed genetic engineering techniques to create antibioticresistant and vaccine-subverting strains of smallpox, anthrax, plague, and tularemia for bioweapon applications (Alibek and Handelman 2000) . Genetically modified zoonotic and epizootic diseases of humans and animals (plague, tularemia, anthrax) and virulent cultivated or wild strains of natural livestock diseases (e.g., foot and mouth disease [FMD] , rinderpest, brucellosis) represent potentially serious threats to livestock, wildlife, and endangered species populations. Plant diseases developed for bioweapons applications against food crops, opium poppies, and coca plants may, however, infect nontarget species of wild plants and become established locally subsequent to their introduction to new environments (Madden and van den Bosch 2002) .
Bioterrorist uses of enzootic livestock diseases and emerging zoonotic diseases (diseases that can be transmitted between animal and human populations) represent a potentially serious threat to livestock and wildlife populations never previously exposed to these diseases. This risk holds true even, and perhaps especially in some instances, for wildlife species that may become infected by serious livestock diseases without exhibiting overt clinical signs of infection. Many formerly ubiquitous diseases that have been eradicated from livestock populations in the United States and Western Europe over the past century are still common elsewhere and readily accessible to individuals and terrorist organizations. Vaccines for many animal diseases still common in developing countries have been phased out in Europe and North America, and these vaccines, along with drugs for routine treatment, may not be readily available in sufficient quantities to suppress large-scale disease outbreaks among animals and livestock.
Many of the bioweapons agents cultured and tested for use against animals and humans during the early decades of the 20th century were not highly contagious organisms. Current biological weapons arsenals, however, include diseases that are highly infectious and contagious, easy to produce and deploy, and able to cause high morbidity or mortality in human and animal populations. Diseases of particular concern for their bioweapons potential include smallpox, tularemia, plague, Newcastle disease, FMD, classical swine fever ("hog cholera"), avian influenza, African swine fever, Rift Valley fever, African horse sickness, rinderpest, and Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (OTA 1993 , CNS 2002 , Kortepeter et al. 2001 . Prior assumptions that bioweaponeers and bioterrorists might not be willing to endanger their own lives in developing and deploying highly contagious human diseases need to be reevaluated in the light of the many recent suicide attacks in the United States and Israel.
It is important to emphasize that bioterrorist attacks against livestock or crops do not require access to weaponized diseases or laboratory cultures of disease organisms, nor do they involve organisms that may cause disease in humans. Samples of infectious materials obtained or cultured from infected plants or animals (or by-products thereof) are all that would be required in many instances (Brown 1999) . Natural, highly virulent diseases of livestock that are easily acquired and transported, not dangerous to humans, and capable of causing catastrophic epidemics in countries with industrialized livestock production methods are common and widely distributed within many countries around the world. Virulent contagious diseases of livestock such as anthrax, rinderpest, and FMD are still enzootic and sometimes even common within a number of countries associated with highly organized, well-financed, and globally active terrorist organizations (Roeder 1999 , Tucker 2000 . No elaborate delivery technologies or methods are necessary for clandestine, economically targeted bioweapons attacks on agricultural crops or livestock. All that is required is a willing actor or conspirator, a little careful planning, and access to an appropriate disease agent (OTA 1993) .
The use of bioweapons for the purpose of economic sabotage against national agricultural and livestock industries is a potentially serious threat to biodiversity. Not only do bioweapons have direct effects on the genetic diversity of domesticated plants and animals, there is also the potential for both direct and indirect consequences on plant and animal populations. In this article, we focus on the potential effects of the use of laboratory-cultured bioweapons as well as natural ("wild-type") disease organisms as biological weapons within and among animal populations. Much of what we discuss also applies to the potential effects of plant bioweapons on nontarget species of wild and domesticated plants. (OTA 1993 , Kortepeter et al. 2001 , CNS 2002 . Plant bioweapons cultured and tested for disrupting agriculture and food production have included fungal diseases (Fusarium spp., Tilletia spp.), viral diseases, and even insect pests (e.g., Colorado potato beetle, Leptinotarsa decemlineata).
Biological warfare and bioterrorism
The former USSR sponsored extensive research on possible bioweapons applications of a variety of fungal diseases of important food crops (wheat stem rust, rice blast), viral and bacterial diseases of domesticated livestock (e.g., anthrax, tularemia, malignant catarrhal fever), and insect disease vectors (mosquitoes, ticks, fleas) (Bozheyeva et al. 1999) . The Soviet bioweapons program tested plant and livestock bioweapon diseases for potential deployment, with the goal of disrupting food production and food processing infrastructures and damaging the agricultural sector of national economies (Alibek and Handelman 2000) . Soviet scientists reportedly used newly developed genetic engineering techniques to create vaccine-subverting and antibiotic-resistant strains of anthrax, plague, tularemia, and smallpox for attacks against military forces and civilian populations (Bozheyeva et al. 1999, Alibek and Handelman 2000) . Most, perhaps even all, of the cultivated and potentially weaponized diseases identified by the Office International des Epizooties as possible major threats to livestock and wildlife species (FMD, rinderpest, Newcastle disease, African swine fever, sheep pox, and Rift Valley fever; OIE 2001) were experimentally tested for bioweapons applications under the Soviet bioweapons research and development program (Bozheyeva et al. 1999 , Kortepeter et al. 2001 Countries believed to have active biowarfare research programs during recent years include some former USSR states (i.e., Russia, Kazakstan), Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Israel, Egypt, Taiwan, China, South Africa, Libya, Cuba, Romania, Bulgaria, Pakistan, India, United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United States (Leitenberg 2000) . Several major international terrorist organizations, including but not restricted to the Al Qaeda network, are believed to have the financial resources and political contacts needed to access state-of-the-art bioweapon disease cultures and production technologies. Aum Shinrikyo, a Japanese terrorist group that used sarin gas for a terrorist attack on the Tokyo subway system, was also involved in developing terrorist bioweapons employing anthrax spores, botulism toxin, Q fever, and Ebola virus (Christopher et al. 1997) .
Recent advances in molecular biology and genetic engineering have opened the way for a potential Pandora's box scenario, in which the unforeseen proliferation of a bioweapon organism could severely affect human and animal populations at regional, continental, or even global levels. Recent genetransfer experiments with viral interleukin4 and viral diseases of the house mouse (Mus musculus) have demonstrated that even carefully controlled and monitored genetic engineering experiments may produce entirely unanticipated results, generating viruses or organisms with unwanted, deleterious, and sometimes extremely dangerous properties (Jackson et al. 2001 ).
Threats to biodiversity and endangered species
There is a growing but still insufficient scientific recognition of the importance of disease control for the conservation of biodiversity and endangered species populations (Daszak et al. 2000) . Organisms that are relatively benign in their natural hosts can cause fatal diseases in other species. Cross-species infections with human herpes simplex Type 1 may be fatal for New World marmosets (Callithrix spp.), and an apparently benign herpes virus of African elephants (Loxodonta africana) causes a fatal systemic disease in Asian elephants (Elephas maximus) (Richman et al. 1999) . Saprolegnia ferox, a common oomycete disease of hatchery-reared fishes, has been implicated as a factor in disease-related population declines of amphibians in northwestern North America (Kiesecker et al. 2001) . Avian malaria and avian pox have been implicated in the extinctions of native bird species in Hawaii, and MacPhee and Marx (1997) suggest that diseases introduced through humans and human commensals may have been a factor in prehistoric mass extinctions of wildlife species in Madagascar and North America.
The use of biological weapons against livestock populations or agricultural crops could have potentially disastrous spillover effects on wild species of plants and animals (Brown 1999 , Daszak et al. 2000 . Many of the currently available bioweapon pathogens are broad-spectrum diseases that are capable of causing high levels of mortality or morbidity among wild and domesticated species of animals, as well as human beings (figure 1). Three of the four genetically modified pathogens created specifically for bioweapon attacks against human populations are zoonotic diseases whose release into the environment may pose both direct and indirect threats to wildlife populations (i.e., anthrax, plague, tularemia; Alibek and Handelman 2000) . Virulent strains of natural disease pathogens known to have been cultured and tested for bioweapon attacks against domesticated livestock (e.g., rinderpest, FMD, brucellosis) could have potentially devastating effects on naive and susceptible populations of susceptible wild ungulates.
The Great African Rinderpest epizootic of a century ago provides a useful model for predicting the potential effects of the proliferation of highly virulent and contagious bioweapon diseases on susceptible wildlife and livestock species. Rinderpest virus was introduced into Africa in 1887 through cattle imported to Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) from India to provision European colonial armies. The subsequent epidemic outbreak of rinderpest that began in 1889 swept from the Horn of Africa to the southern cape in less than a decade, ex-hibiting an effective average dispersal rate of approximately 3 km per day during an era predating automobiles and aircraft. The rinderpest panzootic proliferated rapidly among native African cattle breeds and susceptible wild ungulate species, killing an estimated 90% to 95% of the cattle, African buffalo (Syncerus caffer), and wildebeest (Connochaetes taurinus) in East Africa within 3 years of its first appearance in the region (Daszak et al. 2000) . Cattle populations were devastated and African buffalo extirpated from most of their range in southern and eastern Africa. The African buffalo, formerly the most characteristic and abundant ungulate of the African plains, was reduced to a few small, scattered relict herds (Sinclair 1979) . Despite intensive control efforts over the past century, rinderpest is still enzootic within East Africa, with periodic outbreaks occurring among livestock and wildlife populations in the region (Dobson 1994) .
The importance of buffalo as a food resource for African hunter-gatherer societies was surpassed, however, by the immense importance of domesticated cattle to pastoral and agricultural societies of eastern and southern Africa. Cattle have served for centuries, and in some instances perhaps millennia, as the principal source of food, wealth, and motive energy for the Nilotic and Bantu peoples of eastern and southern Africa. The rinderpest epidemic effectively dispossessed indigenous African peoples of food resources, traditional livelihoods, and wealth and property in ways that were potentially more disruptive to traditional cultural milieus than the physical displacement from traditional territories and the political and economic subjugation of African peoples by European colonial administrations. Milk and meat from cattle provide critically important sources of essential dietary protein in African pastoral and agrarian societies (Holtzman 2001) , while the cattle themselves were (and still are throughout much of the continent) important for the cultivation and fertilization of food crops and as the principal real property assets of families living under communal or open landtenure systems.
The Nilotic pastoral peoples of eastern Africa who depended entirely or primarily on the blood and milk of cattle for nutrition and subsistence were devastated by the rinder- In evolutionary and ecological terms, however, the impacts of the great rinderpest epidemic on African ungulate faunas may have been surpassed by the effects of the chestnut blight fungus (Cryphonectria parasitica, formerly Endothia parasitica) on the temperate deciduous forest biome of eastern North America. The American chestnut (C. dentata), once the dominant and most abundant tree species of eastern North American forests, has been extirpated throughout its range by the chestnut blight. Before disappearance, the American chestnut was an important timber and fuelwood tree that provided an abundant and high-quality food resource for wildlife, livestock, and human populations throughout much of eastern North America. Chestnut blight was first recorded in New York City in 1904, presumably having been introduced along with Japanese chestnut trees (C. crenata) imported as nursery stock. The chestnut blight spread at a rate estimated at between 20-50 miles per year, reducing the American chestnut to a state of virtual extinction throughout its range by 1950. Current efforts to save the American chestnut from extinction focus on biological control of the disease itself through a virulence-attenuating virus and hybridization and backcrossing with a blight-resistant related species, the Chinese chestnut (C. mollissima). The American elm (Ulmus americana) is another characteristic and formerly common tree of eastern North American landscapes that has also been driven to virtual extinction by an introduced fungal pathogen, the Dutch elm disease Ophiostoma (Ceratocystis) ulmi.
A century later, New York City is the apparent entry site for an emerging and potentially fatal disease of humans and animals, the West Nile virus (WNV). The establishment and spread of WNV in North America after its appearance in 1999 is perhaps the best available modern example of the potential dispersal capabilities of bioweapon diseases within and among human and animal populations. The dispersion of WNV illustrates the immense (and in some cases possibly insurmountable) difficulties in identifying and controlling cryptic and potentially lethal zoonotic diseases. WNV is a mosquito-transmitted disease of birds and mammals, including humans, which causes high rates of mortality in some host species (Rappole et al. 2000) . Although WNV is primarily a disease of birds, mammals are common secondary but dead-end hosts for this virus. WNV infections have been reported from numerous species of both wild and domesticated mammals (e.g., humans, horses, cats, bats, chipmunks, skunks, squirrels, domestic rabbits, and raccoons). West Nile virus has become firmly established in eastern North America during the past 3 years, and it appears probable that migrating birds may ultimately spread the disease throughout the Americas and the Caribbean. As of March 2002, WNV has been confirmed in 27 states in the eastern United States, as well as in Ontario (Canada) and the Cayman Islands (ERAP 2002) .
The history of bovine tuberculosis and rinderpest in Africa and brucellosis in North America shows that exotic diseases may be difficult or impossible to eradicate once they have been introduced and have become established in wild species within new localities. In the case of anthrax, the risk of subsequent disease outbreaks within contaminated areas may continue for decades and even centuries after the total eradication of hosts and vectors: Viable, infectious anthrax bacilli have been cultured from animal bones buried for 150 to 200 years in archeological sites (de Vos 1990, Dixon et al. 1999) . Bioweapon diseases may spread faster and prove much more difficult to suppress and eradicate than the historical examples cited above might indicate, given the exceptional virulence and environmental resilience of cultured bioweapon disease strains (Alibek and Handelman 2000) .
Bioweapon threats to biodiversity
Efforts to control human disease epidemics resulting from plague and tularemia bioweapon attacks will need to take into account the eradication of potential animal reservoirs and insect vectors once initial outbreaks among human populations have been contained (Alibek and Handelman 2000) . As potential disease reservoirs, rare or endangered species populations within affected areas may be subject to eradication as well. Thus, endangered species now restricted to a few relict and isolated populations within highly urbanized landscapes (e.g., Stephen's Kangagroo Rat, Dipodomys stephensi) could be at high risk for extinction under such circumstances. It is worth noting in this context that an extraordinarily high number of endangered and threatened species (including D. stephensi) are now largely or entirely restricted to habitats located in and around US military installations and military training ranges, which could be potential targets of bioweapons attacks; more than 220 federally listed threatened or endangered species have been confirmed as residents or migrants on US military lands . Although military lands represent only about 3% of all US federal lands, they contain disproportionately high percentages of habitat for endangered species of plants and animals (Leslie et al. 1996) .
Wild plant and animal species that are naturally rare and species that have been severely depleted in numbers from overharvesting or habitat degradation are particularly susceptible to extinction by introduced diseases (Dobson and May 1986) . Diseases to which humans and human commensals have developed immunity or high levels of resistance may cause catastrophic mortality in naive and susceptible wildlife populations. Small absolute population sizes, inbreeding depres-sion, and exposure to exotic disease organisms are a potential recipe for the extinction of endangered and threatened wildlife species (Singer et al. 2001 ). There needs to be much wider recognition by scientists and the public of the danger that diseases of domesticated animals and humans pose for wildlife and endangered species populations, and of the pivotal role of human interventions in fostering the introduction and establishment of exotic diseases of plants and animals to new areas (Dudley 1993 , Daszak et al. 2000 . Bioweapon applications are only the most extreme example of the larger invasive species problems associated with the introductions of exotic diseases and organisms to new areas as the result of deliberate or inadvertent human activities.
The potentially devastating harm of even localized disease outbreaks on endangered species is illustrated by the effects of canine distemper on the North American blackfooted ferret (Mustela nigripes), the Caspian seal (Phoca caspica), and the African wild dog (Lycaon pictus). Canine distemper is a common viral disease of domesticated dogs that can spill over into wildlife populations, with appalling results on susceptible species of wild carnivores. Disturbingly, canine distemper is also a disease that has been cultured and tested in bioweapon laboratories (Kortepeter et al. 2001) . During the past decade, canine distemper outbreaks resulted in the extinction of the last known wild population of the North American black-footed ferret and the African wild dog population of the Serengeti National Park in Tanzania (Daszak et al. 2000) . Habitat loss and persecution, exacerbated by the effects of canine distemper on ferrets and sylvatic plague on prey populations (prairie dogs), caused the decline and ultimate extinction of black-footed ferrets from their formerly vast range within the Great Plains region of North America. Similarly, persecution and predator-control operations have reduced the once widely distributed African wild dog to a few small and scattered populations that are now gravely threatened by spillover infections of canine distemper and rabies from domestic dog populations (Ginsberg et al. 1995 ). An outbreak of distemper in the Serengeti region of Tanzania during the early 1990s caused the extirpation of the resident wild dog population and the death of approximately one-third of the Serengeti's resident lion population. The small resident population of endangered cheetah (Acinonyx jubatus) could have been driven to the verge of extinction in the Serengeti had they experienced rates of distemper morbidity and mortality comparable to that observed among African wild dogs and lions at this site (Kelly 2001) .
Livestock breed conservation is important for the retention of the genetic raw material for morphological and physiological adaptations that may provide enhanced resistance to insects, parasites, and disease and to the effects of climate, altitude, solar radiation, and other key environmental factors. Worldwide, there are approximately 4000 recognized breeds and local breed varieties of the principal domesticated livestock species (ass, cattle, water buffalo, pig, horse, sheep, goats) . This once great array of local and endemic livestock breeds has been drastically eroded over the past century (Ruane 2000) . At least 700 of the surviving local and traditional breeds of these seven livestock species, including 350 breeds in Europe alone, are in imminent danger of disappearance because of the global emphasis on a few highly cosmopolitan commercial breeds. Most remaining local livestock breeds have critically small population sizes and highly localized distributions, restricted in some instances to only one or two farms located within a single village or township (Ruane 2000) . Local breeds often consist of highly inbred lines that may be susceptible to extinction as the result of even an extremely localized disease outbreak (Ruane 2000 , Toro et al. 2000 . News reports in March 2001 indicated that at least one of England's relict endemic sheep breeds had been condemned to extinction through sanitary slaughter as a consequence of the recent FMD outbreak. In view of the potential effects of sanitary slaughter on the maintenance of genetic diversity within rare livestock breeds, the European Union and British government have now established policies for exempting rare breeds from prohibitions on disease vaccination and precautionary sanitary slaughter under certain circumstances (DEFRA 2002) .
Some diseases that cause high rates of morbidity and mortality in humans or domesticated animals may occur in wildlife species without manifesting clinical signs of disease infection (e.g., hantaviruses, Trypanosma spp.). Control measures for zoonotic diseases may result in concerted efforts to eradicate any and all wildlife species that may be potential reservoirs, intermediate hosts, or vectors for disease transmission to humans or domesticated animals. Containment of plague and tularemia disease outbreaks resulting from bioweapon attacks will necessitate the control or eradication of rodent populations within affected areas to prevent the subsequent transmission of the disease from infected rodents to humans (Alibek and Handelman 2000) . Populations of many wildlife species are already routinely subject to stringent control or local extirpation in many areas to control the transmission of endemic diseases to domesticated animals, in some instances without any supporting evidence to validate the clinical efficacy of such efforts.
In the United States, programs to control brucellosis in cattle populations have resulted in the culling or attempted eradication of populations of bison (Bison bison), elk (Cervus canadensis), and whitetail deer (Odocoileus virginiana). Other examples of such control programs include the routine culling of wild boar (Sus scrofa) populations in several European countries to control the transmission of classical swine fever to domesticated swine. Rabies control programs target populations of red fox (Vulpes vulpes) in Europe and North America, jackals (Canis mesomelas) in eastern and southern Africa, raccoons (Procyon lotor) in southern and eastern North America. In Central and South America, vampire bats (Desmodus rotundus) and other bat species are killed in large numbers to reduce rabies infections among humans and livestock.Veterinary quarantine and control programs for wild animals have been successfully constrained or curtailed in some areas by strong public opposition, however. For exam-ple, efforts currently under way to reduce the incidence of Lyme disease among humans by the large-scale culling of whitetail deer populations in the eastern United States have been blocked in many localities as the result of political lobbying and legal challenges by animal rights organizations (e.g., Animal Protection Institute 1997).
Conflict and contagion
Breakdowns in medical and veterinary support systems during wars and civil conflicts have resulted in epidemic outbreaks of diseases within and among human, livestock, and wildlife populations (Lawrence et al. 1980 , Kobuch et al. 1990 ). Recent outbreaks of several lethal epizootic diseases (monkeypox, Marburg fever, plague) in Central Africa have been linked to increased human consumption of species of wild animals (e.g., squirrels and rodents) as the result of wartime food shortages, coupled with the disappearance of preferred bushmeat species (primates, duikers) caused by overharvesting for the bushmeat trade (Fenner 1993 , IRIN 1997 . The Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf war precipitated rinderpest epizootics among livestock populations in that region, which may have been caused or aggravated by war-related displacements of pastoralists and their flocks (Roeder 1999) .
Disruption of government veterinary services during the civil war in Southern Rhodesia is believed to have contributed to epidemic outbreaks of anthrax and rabies among wild and domesticated animals in that country, now named Zimbabwe. Anthrax mortality among humans and livestock reached epidemic proportions in 1979 and 1980 and continued to proliferate for more than 4 years following the end of the civil war in 1980 (Lawrence et al. 1980 , Kobuch et al. 1990 ). Control and containment of the disease may have been hindered by internal ethnic and political conflicts in the Matabeleland region during the early postwar era (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) . Anthrax ultimately spread through six of Zimbabwe's eight provinces, with more than 10,000 recorded human cases before effective control of the disease was finally reestablished in 1987 (Pugh and Davies 1990) . Although anthrax is endemic to the Matabeleland region of Zimbabwe, where the outbreak first appeared and proliferated, widely publicized speculation has it that the 1979-1987 anthrax epidemic may have been linked to covert operations of the apartheid South African Defense Force, the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization, or rival guerrilla factions (Carus 2001) .
However, there seems to be little evidence to support allegations of the use of weaponized anthrax against human populations in Zimbabwe, as the vast majority of documented cases involved secondary cutaneous infections resulting from apparent contact with diseased cattle (Kobuch et al. 1990, Pugh and Davies 1990) . This interpretation appears to be supported by the subsequent resurgence of human anthrax in Zimbabwe in recent years (Mwenye et al. 1996) , with nearly 1000 documented human cases and at least 11 deaths recorded in 2000 and 2001 (ISID 2001) . Economic distress and the disruption of anthrax vaccination programs and veterinary services as the result of internal political turmoil appear to be important factors behind the current anthrax outbreak in Zimbabwe, as was apparently the case during the 1979-1987 outbreak as well. Deteriorating economic conditions and food shortages seem to be driving villagers to risk disease or death from infections acquired through butchering diseased cattle for the consumption or sale of meat and hides (ISID 2001 ).
Technologies and threats
The threat of attacks with biological weapons has increased greatly since the ratification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in 1975. Although recent advances in biotechnology have augmented the potential economic value of the genetic diversity of organisms by enabling the transfer of genes between even unrelated species (Perrings et al. 1995) , they have also increased the threat of their elimination through the use of genetically modified disease organisms as weapons of mass destruction. The breakup of the Soviet bioweapons program and the dispersal of its scientists and technicians may have heightened, rather than lowered, the global proliferation of bioweapons technologies (Bozheyeva et al. 1999) . The basic techniques for culturing many bioweapon organisms are relatively simple, and microbrewery and pharmaceutical equipment, easily adaptable for bioweapons production, is readily available through domestic and international commercial markets (OTA 1993) . The cost of developing small-scale but nonetheless sophisticated bioweapons facilities and arsenals is in the range of $10,000 to $100,000, an amount easily affordable for affluent and technologically sophisticated domestic terrorist groups like the Aum Shinrikyo or well-funded international organizations such as Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah (USCNS/21 1999) .
Nevertheless, specialized technicians and state-of-the-art research facilities are not necessary for the production and deployment of many highly dangerous bioweapons organisms for clandestine, economically targeted assaults on agricultural crops or livestock populations (OTA 1993) . Bioweapon cultures, diseased animals, or infectious materials could be easily introduced into international cargo transportation networks for shipment to the United States or elsewhere, with virtually no risk of identification or interception (Flynn 2000) . The spillover of weaponized livestock diseases into susceptible wildlife populations could amplify and exacerbate the effects of initial attacks and create situations in which disease containment and control could become extremely difficult and total eradication virtually impossible (Daszak et al. 2000) .
There appears to be increasing interest on the part of international terrorist groups in bioweapons technologies and applications. There is evidence that bioweapon research facilities have been established in countries such as Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya that are known to have (or have had) cooperative or supportive relationships with international terrorist organizations. Nonetheless, we predict that runaway disease epidemics resulting from terrorist uses of bioweapons will most likely arise from accidental or inadvertent releases of virulent, broad-spectrum disease agents in developing countries, as the result of
• improper handling or inadequate containment within production and storage facilities
• incidental and accidental deployments of disease agents in transit
• inadvertent releases resulting from the disruption or destruction of bioweapon production or storage facilities (e.g., a cruise missile attack on an alleged chemical weapons production facility)
Economic impacts
The recent outbreak of FMD in Britain demonstrates that even countries with a well-organized and technologically sophisticated veterinary services infrastructure are susceptible to introductions (whether deliberate or inadvertent) of highly infectious pathogenic agents into their livestock populations. The economic consequences of a disease epidemic affecting livestock are severe for any country, whether industrialized or developing. For example, the total costs of containment and eradication of the 1997 FMD outbreak in Taiwan approached $15 billion. Direct and indirect losses to the British economy associated with the 2001 FMD outbreak are expected to be $12 billion to $14 billion (OIE 2001 Technical and logistical capabilities for countering the impacts of disease threats from bioweapons and emerging infectious diseases may be handicapped by the ongoing proliferation of drug-resistant disease strains of important diseases such as tuberculosis (Mycobacterium tuberculosis) and malaria (Plasmodium spp.). Improper use and inappropriate uses of antibiotics to suppress diseases and infections in both humans and animals are contributing to the emergence of drugresistant strains of many important human and animal pathogens. The current widespread use of antibiotics in livestock feeds, now banned only in the European Union, may have serious epidemiological consequences (McDonald et al. 2001) . Nearly half of all antibiotics used in the United States are dispensed in animal feeds, despite growing scientific concern over that practice (Gorbach 2001) .
Incomplete treatment regimens, inappropriate clinical applications, adulterated medicines, and both inadvertent and deliberate subtherapeutic uses of antibiotics are resulting in the evolution-through human selection-of highly resistant and highly virulent strains of disease organisms. In effect, the current situation represents an ongoing, essentially uncontrolled field experiment in the cultivation and proliferation of antibiotic-resistant microbe populations. This problem may well be aggravated by fear of exposure to bioterrorist at-tacks-witness the panic-inspired purchases and consumption of antibiotics by American citizens after the anthrax attacks during September and November 2001. Subsequent events proved that such concerns were not entirely unwarranted-5 of the 21 people known to have contracted anthrax as the result of exposure to contaminated mail subsequently died as the result of undiagnosed or tardily diagnosed pulmonary anthrax infections.
Conclusions
There appears to be little possibility for preventing bioweapon attacks against domesticated animals and the subsequent spillover of weaponized livestock diseases into wildlife populations. Bioterrorist attacks against livestock would not require access to weapons-grade disease strains or laboratory cultures; natural diseases that can cause catastrophic epidemics are common and widely dispersed within many countries around the world and are easily acquired. The ease and rapidity of international transport of potential human and animal vectors, coupled with the increasing virulence and variety of human-selected and human-engineered disease organisms, are setting the stage for disease epidemic scenarios that could equal or surpass those of any known historical incident. The United States must strengthen its capability for early detection of diseased animals, both wild and domesticated, and increase the availability of control technologies and containment facilities. Scientists and agricultural economists must communicate with policymakers and legislators to impress upon them the potential importance of spillover impacts of agricultural bioweapons on ecosystems and nonagricultural sectors of national economies.
Our ability to understand and control the spread of diseases within and among human and animal populations is growing, but it is still insufficient to counter the existing threats posed by bioweapons and a growing number of newly recognized emerging infectious diseases. Interdisciplinary and international efforts to increase the surveillance and identification of disease pathogens, and to better understand the potential dynamics of disease transmission within and among human and animal populations in both industrialized and developing countries, will greatly enhance our ability to combat the effects of bioweapons and emerging diseases on biotas and biodiversity.
Improved mechanisms for interagency and intergovernmental communication, cooperation, and collaboration are necessary to effectively combat and control the threats of bioweapon disease outbreaks. Expenditures on disease prevention and on containment and control infrastructure may prove expensive in the short term, but collateral benefits for public health and food security will greatly enhance the value of such investment to the national and global economy. Failures in the prevention and containment of bioweapon disease outbreaks could result in the erosion of genetic diversity in wild and domesticated animal species, the extinction of endangered species, the extirpation of indigenous peoples, and the destruction of human livelihoods and traditional cultures.
